INTRODUCTION
For over a century, reinsurance has been the preferred vehicle to shed primary insurers' catastrophe risk exposure. 1 The Cologne Reinsurance Company was the first professional reinsurance company, founded in 1842 following a catastrophic fire in Hamburg the same year. 2 Insurers have an increasing demand for more financial capacity when underwriting catastrophic risks. For example, reinsurers paid primary insurers 60 percent of the insured losses from the September 11 terrorist attacks, 65 percent from Hurricane Katrina, and 40 percent from Hurricane Sandy more recently. 3 With respect to catastrophic risks, reinsurance's role takes several forms. Reinsurance can take a significant portion of the insured losses from primary insurers, diversify catastrophe risks globally, supply underwriting assistance, and regulate insurers' behavior to promote risk mitigation.
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To discuss all these questions is not possible within the scope of this Article. This Article will mainly argue why the Chinese government should adopt government-sponsored reinsurance and how to expand regulation by reinsurance to achieve optimal catastrophe risk management. The Article begins by introducing basic principles of reinsurance. Next, the Article explores the main regulatory techniques of reinsurance which offer primary insurers incentives to underwrite appropriately and mitigate risk. Then, the Article discusses reasons why the private reinsurance market cannot provide adequate coverage for catastrophe risks and the arguments for government-sponsored reinsurance. Next, the Article examines and compares several typical government-sponsored reinsurance programs, including programs in France (Caisse Centrale de Réassurance (CCR)), Japan (Japanese Earthquake Reinsurance Scheme (JERS)), and Turkey (Turkish Catastrophe Insurance Pool (TCIP)), in which primary insurers are regulated by reinsurance. Finally, the Article argues that China should adopt government-sponsored reinsurance to address catastrophe risks, and the possibility and feasibility of regulation by government-sponsored reinsurance in China is addressed.
II. REINSURANCE BASICS
A.
INTRODUCTION OF REINSURANCE
Reinsurance can be understood simply as insurers' insurance. Under an insurance contract, a policyholder is protected from loss by transferring risk to an insurer; analogously, under a reinsurance contract, an insurer (the cedent or ceding company) is protected from exposure by transferring risk to a reinsurer. 8 From the demand perspective, there are many theoretical explanations for a primary insurer's decision to purchase reinsurance. For example, Hoerger, Sloan, and Hassan consider that the motive for reinsuring is to avoid bankruptcy, even for an insurer that is not averse to risk (a risk-neutral insurer). 9 According to other explanations, insurers demand reinsurance if they face catastrophic losses, insufficient 8 FED. INS. OFF., U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, supra note 3, at 1. 9 They use their model to assess how the insurer's surplus, size, and volatility of losses affect the amount of reinsurance the primary insurer purchases. 
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Vol. 23 294 underwriting capacity, higher loss volatility, lower surplus-to-premium ratios, or in the course of retiring from a territory or class of business. 10 From the supply perspective, reinsurance is available from many sources, both domestic and abroad. The providers generally include professional reinsurers, pools and syndicates, direct insurers, and government agencies, which are not mutually exclusive. 11 For example, many direct insurers are legally empowered to sell reinsurance, and they still purchase extra reinsurance from foreign professional reinsurers.
There are two broad categories of reinsurance agreements: treaty reinsurance and facultative reinsurance. Treaty reinsurance covers broad groups of policies and binds the cedent to cede a specific portion of the risk of an entire class of business, such as all property coverage written by the cedents, to a reinsurer through one contract. 12 Compared to treaty reinsurance, facultative reinsurance is often used to cover specific and catastrophic risks 13 because facultative reinsurance allows reinsurers to engage in significant underwriting prior to placing the policy and enables primary insurers to spread the risks of catastrophic losses that would otherwise be beyond their underwriting capacity. 14 
B. REINSURANCE FOR CATASTROPHE INSURERS
In the property-casualty market, the role of reinsurance is more apparent following catastrophes than after other perils. Catastrophes have a low probability of occurrence but cause very significant human and financial losses. Insurers are reluctant to underwrite catastrophes and even exclude these risks from coverage. The general theoretical explanation for why primary insurers do not cover catastrophe losses is that losses from these events are too large and too highly correlated for insurers to bear 10 Reinsurance plays a major role in making catastrophes insurable and serves an important function as protection against the accumulation of losses from catastrophes. 17 For reinsurers, because of their ability to diversify globally, catastrophe risks can be characterized as globally insurable. 18 For example, the risk of hurricanes in the United States is independent of the risk of earthquake in China. This provides the economic motivation for reinsurers to aggregate catastrophe risks over geographic regions and different catastrophe lines.
19 By diversifying losses across the world, catastrophes may not impose unbearable losses on the reinsurer when compared to its overall book of business, making it possible for reinsurers to provide coverage and pay losses.
20
While primary insurance tends to be a local business, reinsurance is more of an international business, especially for catastrophic risks. 21 For example, in 2005, Hurricane Katrina caused around $90 billion in insured property losses in the United States, of which non-US reinsurers paid approximately $59 billion. 22 Because US primary insurers can access the global reinsurance market, they are able to provide coverage and pay 15 "When losses are highly correlated, insurers' claims experience is expected to be lumpy -the presence of one claim implies a likelihood of many claims. Several years may result in no claims, but some years will have gigantic levels of claims, and the strain of being prepared for a disaster year means insurers must either charge high premiums, or face the risk of bankruptcy. The conventional wisdom is that insurers choose to exclude these risks from coverage, rather than expose themselves to the year-to-year uncertainty endemic to correlated risks. (Figure 3) . The largest reinsurers are in Europe and the Caribbean and are not confined to domestic reinsurers. 24 In addition, reinsurers have developed new products such as catastrophe bonds, catastrophe derivatives, contingent capital, sidecars, and other hybrid products to facilitate new capital flows from the capital market into the reinsurance market. 25 As a result, capital in the reinsurance market has generally been increasing year-over-year for most of the past decade ( Figure 2) . 26 For example, as of mid-2014, global reinsurance capital amounted to $570 billion ($511 billion is classified as traditional capital and $59 billion as alternative capital). 27 This accessible outside capital enables reinsurers to assume more insured catastrophe losses. 23 Cummins, supra note 5, at 184. 24 Europe is the origin of reinsurance business, and in Europe, the insurance tax laws do allow tax-deductible reserves against future losses. In the Caribbean, a number of countries have created special tax havens. See Jaffee, supra note 18, at 167. 25 Catastrophe bonds are risked-linked securities that transfer catastrophe risks from insurers to investors through fully-collateralized special purpose vehicles (SPV). Catastrophe derivatives are financial contracts used to spread catastrophe risk to capital market investors that derive value from the value of financial instruments, events or conditions; for example, the event can be a wind storm making landfall within a certain distance of a given location. A contingent capital arrangement is a type of financing that is arranged before a loss occurs. Sidecars are special purpose vehicles formed by insurance and reinsurance companies to provide additional capacity to write reinsurance, usually for property catastrophes and marine risks. REGULATORY ACTIVITIES OF REINSURANCE In many respects, reinsurance often goes beyond pure risk transfer and expands to help solve catastrophic risk management issues through serving as an enforcer of compliance with government regulations and reinsurance contracts. 30 A major difficulty with catastrophe reinsurance is moral hazard, a problem also encountered by primary insurance vis-à-vis policyholders. It is logical for primary insurers to change their behavior as soon as the risk is fully ceded to the reinsurer. As a private regulator, reinsurance provides incentives for the primary insurers to engage in mitigation and prevention of catastrophe losses, and thus reduce moral hazard. Reinsurance has a direct and significant impact on the business operation of primary insurance and even an indirect impact on the insureds, from contract design such as pricing, through underwriting and issuing of a 29 
2017
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policy, and ending with agreeing or refusing to pay for a claim. 31 This part introduces four main tools that almost all reinsurers use to one degree or another to control moral hazard: loss-sensitive premiums, the duty of utmost good faith, providing risk management service, and indirect regulation of insureds. To be clear, I do not contend that these activities will exclusively solve moral hazard, nor do I contend that moral hazard management provides an adequate description for addressing catastrophe risk. However, by supplying both the incentive and the know-how that primary insurers often lack, reinsurance can realize value enhancing.
LOSS-SENSITIVE PREMIUMS
Catastrophes usually cause numerous claims at the same time. Insurers tend to pass on correlated losses to their reinsurers and thus the moral hazard problem becomes severe. 32 Traditionally, reinsurers could control moral hazard by monitoring primary insurers' business operations, including their underwriting activities and claims settlements. More importantly, reinsurers could use loss-sensitive premiums to control moral hazard. Loss-sensitive premiums generally refer to the situation where "the price of reinsurance is sensitive to concurrent reinsurance losses and to the prior period's losses total and reinsured losses."
33 Loss-sensitive premiums require that reinsurance premiums should reflect an actuarially fair cost and integrate into general techniques like deductibles, co-payments, and "ex post settling up."
34 Neil Doherty and Kent Smetters have proved that reinsurers can control moral hazard effectively by using loss-sensitive premiums when the insurers and reinsurers are not affiliates (i.e., not part of the same financial group). 35 They present a multiperiod principal-agent model of the reinsurance transaction and test it empirically. They find strong evidence for the use of loss-sensitive premiums when the insurer and reinsurer are not affiliates, and their results show that price controls can limit moral hazard. 36 Since insurers and reinsurers are generally not 
300
CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL Vol. 23 300 affiliates in underwriting catastrophe risks, 37 using loss-sensitive premiums is an effective regulatory tool for reinsurers to control moral hazard.
Is using loss-sensitive premiums feasible in practice? The answer could be yes, thanks to risk-sharing mechanisms developed by reinsurance and less rate regulation in reinsurance transactions. First, several effective risk-sharing mechanisms are often introduced for catastrophe reinsurance premium design. The first one is retrospective rating, which adjusts premiums based on losses incurred during the policy period. 38 The second one is experience rating, which adjusts premiums based on losses in previous periods and which is useful when retrospective rating is not available. 39 Furthermore, although catastrophe perils are relatively rare, when series data on losses and claims is missing, the alternative method is using exposure-based modeling, which relies on scientific information and expert opinion; claims experience is only used to check and calibrate the model. 40 Second, compared to primary insurance, reinsurance markets are lightly regulated except in a few countries such as the United Kingdom, where reinsurers are regulated in the same way as direct insurers.
B. THE DUTY OF UTMOST GOOD FAITH
Primary insurers' duty of utmost good faith is the core principle of the reinsurance relationship. 42 Utmost good faith is an expressive phrase borrowed from Roman law, uberrima fides, which is defined as the "most abundant good faith; absolute and perfect candor or openness and honesty; the absence of any concealment or deception, however slight." 43 The reinsurance premium is less than the primary insurance premium; otherwise, primary insurers would have no incentives to underwrite such risk. Thus reinsurers cannot duplicate the costly but necessary efforts of the primary insurer in evaluating risks and handling claims. Through obligating 37 See id. at 378 ("Insurance of natural catastrophes is often undertaken by regional or national primary insurers and reinsured by national or international reinsurance firms."). 
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primary insurers to act in good faith, reinsurers can control moral hazard through "invisible" monitoring without high cost.
44
The duty of utmost good faith requires the primary insurer to disclose all material facts which may affect the subject risk. 45 Those material facts may include the reinsured's underwriting process; the reinsured's amendment, renewal, or commutation in the placing of reinsurance; the payment of claims; and whether risks have been ceded fraudulently contrary to a treaty or representations. 46 As one court has stated, "[I]nsurance authorities are agreed that a ceding company, which is in possession of all the details relating to the risk, is required to exercise the utmost good faith in all its dealings with the reinsurer." 47 This places the reinsurer in the same position as the reinsured "to give him the same means and opportunity of judging…the value of risks." 48 To be notable, utmost good faith requires the insurer to provide timely notice of claim in some courts, 49 because it permits the reinsurer "to reserve properly, to adjust premiums to reflect the loss experience under the reinsurance contract, and to decide whether to exercise the option of becoming associated with the ceding insurer in the handling and disposition of the claim." 50 As the core principle of the reinsurance relationship, the utmost good faith is enforced by many mechanisms. The first mechanism is the specific reinsurance contract provisions. It is a kind of private legislation since the parties to the reinsurance contract are sufficiently sophisticated. For example, reinsurers often include the "audit and inspection clauses" in the reinsurance contract which require "the reinsured's records relative to the contract sessions to be always open to the reinsurer at reasonable times." 51 Such clauses guarantee and protect reinsurers' access to their reinsured's underwriting and claims handling practices. The second 302 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL Vol. 23 302 mechanism is court enforcement. The court often recognizes that primary insurers' failure to act in utmost good faith offers the reinsurer a defense to its reinsurance obligation. 52 More importantly, the court requires of primary insurers such behavior as a condition precedent to reinsurers' performance of indemnity obligation. 53 In the case of catastrophes in which reinsurance is triggered by extremely large dollar-value claims, primary insurers will undoubtedly take the enforcement of utmost good faith into serious consideration. A third mechanism by which reinsurance promotes efficiency is longer-term relationship controls. Reinsurance is generally not a one-off deal but conducted as a long-term relationship. Long-term relationships bond both parties, and the reinsurer can increase the effectiveness of its monitoring because the reinsurer can use past experience to set future prices and terms, or even to refuse to underwrite.
C. PROVIDING RISK MANAGEMENT SERVICE
Reinsurers can act not only as capital suppliers but also as risk management service providers. For relatively simple products, reinsurers may simply act as capital suppliers. As for complex products, such as underwriting catastrophic risks, reinsurers may take a more active role, more analogous to product-design consultants, through facultative reinsurance. 55 Since reinsurers deal with different catastrophe lines among geographic regions in the world, they are in a better position to share their experiences with the ceding companies. Providing risk management service for the primary insurers can take several forms: (1) Entry into the market. Global reinsurers can help potential new market participants remove entry barriers, especially for those in developing countries, and allow insurers to enter this new market slowly by initially reinsuring a large portion of their risks. 56 60 The reinsurer has strong incentives to regulate the insureds. Some primary insurance policy includes "cut-out" provisions which allow a direct action by the insureds against the reinsurer. "Cut-out" provisions allow "an endorsement to an insurance policy or reinsurance contract which provides that, in the event of the insolvency of the insurance company, the amount of any loss which would have been recovered from the reinsurer by the insurance company (or its statutory receiver) will be paid instead directly to the policyholder, claimant, or other payee, as specified by the endorsement, by the reinsurer. 64 Therefore, the risks underwritten by a primary insurer who has made the fronting agreement with a reinsurer will be assumed in the end by the reinsurer. 65 In other words, the reinsurer will be responsible for the entire amount that it is required to pay under the original policy. Generally, the licensed insurer will receive a fee for acting as the "front,"
66 while the reinsurers can act as insurers to regulate insureds through risk-based pricing, contract design, claims management, and refusal to insure.
IV. REASONS FOR GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED REINSURANCE FOR CATASTROPHES
The previous section explored the main regulatory techniques of reinsurance which control primary insurers' moral hazard and offer them incentives to underwrite approprately and mitigate risk. This leads to the issue of how government-provided reinsurance works and how it differs from regulation by private reinsurance. Before answering these questions, a prerequisite discussion should be why the government is involved in catastrophe reinsurance and why not leave all catastrophe reinsurance to the private market. The main rationale offered to justify governments' sponsoring catastrophe insurers and acting as reinsurers of catastrophe risks is the imperfections of private reinsurance.
Underwriting cycles show the imperfection of private reinsurance. The phenomenon of the underwriting cycle, which refers to the tendency of insurance markets to go through alternating phases of "hard" and "soft" markets, is an important characteristic of insurance markets. 67 Hard markets are usually triggered by capital depletions resulting from underwriting catastrophic losses of unexpected magnitude.
68 Figure 3  shows is often insufficient reinsuring capacity. Why are so few assets allocated to catastrophe reinsurance? Since the market distortions appear to be more supply-(reinsurer) than demand-(primary insurer) related, 74 explanations for imperfections in the reinsurance market mainly consider supply restrictions. The explanations below are well documented in the law and economics literature.
First, informational asymmetries between capital providers and reinsurers about exposure levels and reserve adequacy can result in high costs of capital during hard markets. 75 It might be more costly for reinsurers to raise additional funds since capital providers cannot clearly separate performance into event losses and reinsurers' skill in peril selection. 76 Irrational investor behavior, such as investor "trend following," may also decrease the supply of capital to reinsurance after a major catastrophe. 77 The consensus in the economics literature is that shortages are driven by capital market and insurance market imperfections that prevent capital from flowing freely into and out of the reinsurance corporations in response to catastrophic losses.
78
A major catastrophe may deplete reinsurer capital and surplus, and require some time to replenish. 79 Without additional funds from capital providers, such depletion of equity capital is likely to result in raised premiums for reinsurance, which are above the expected loss of such CATASTROPHE VICTIMS: A COMPARATIVE LAW AND ECONOMICS APPROACH 136 (2010). 74 According to a set of demand-supply equilibrium points, graphed in terms of price and quantity of reinsurance provided, Froot shows a strong negative correlation between price and quantity supplied emerges. It suggests that supply shocks are the main driver rather than demand-a decline in supply results in an increase in price and decline in quantity of risk transfer. See Froot, supra note 72. 75 
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coverage. 80 Using empirical evidence from the year following Hurricane Andrew for those insurers that had greater exposure to the southeastern United States and to hurricanes wherever they occur, Froot demonstrates that reinsurance "prices rise most where quantities decline most." 81 Second, reinsurers may have market power, and supply shortages and high prices after catastrophes may occur because reinsurers have no incentive to increase their capital. By putting less money at risk and preventing new entry, incumbent reinsurers keep prices high. 82 The former Massachusetts Insurance Commissioner argued that market power among reinsurers is the main reason that catastrophe reinsurance has proved more profitable than insurance. 83 Barriers to entry are also relevant to the market power story. 84 The absence of entry barriers tends to suggest that there is no market power; it is entry barriers that permit sellers to keep prices above marginal costs. Froot has provided empirical evidence to support the hypothesis that there was considerable entry into the reinsurance market in the 1990s. 85 Third, the corporate form of reinsurance ownership may also contribute to short supply in the reinsurance market in the wake of catastrophes. 86 Corporations create agency costs because managers' ("agents") interests may not perfectly align with those of shareholders ("principals"). Managers act in many ways that do not maximize the corporation's value, but instead advance their personal financial interests. GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED CATASTROPHE REINSURANCE PROGRAMS: EXAMPLES Section III described the tools available to reinsurers in regulating insurers and the underwritten catastrophe risks. We saw that through contract design (loss-sensitive premiums), utmost good faith, providing risk management service, and indirect regulation of insureds, reinsurance has the capacity to perform a social function that is regulatory in nature: less moral hazard on the part of primary insurers and better preparedness on the part of insureds. Section IV explained why much of the reinsurance for catastrophe risks in the world is sponsored by the government. Compared with the capital shortfall of private reinsurers, the government can channel capital effectively and quickly after catastrophes since it can raise money through taxes or borrow money by issuing debt or government bonds. 88 This part examines how government-sponsored reinsurance programs work. Government-sponsored reinsurance is increasingly welcomed by law and economics scholarship as a way to manage catastrophic risks. 89 Meanwhile, government-sponsored reinsurance has increased substantially in practice, and many programs are often established when primary-insurance markets break down. It is not possible within the scope of this Article to critically analyze all of the programs that exist, some of which were mentioned in the introduction. Accordingly, this discussion will be limited to the French CCR, the Japanese JERS and the Turkish TCIP. As these examples demonstrate, there is wide variation in the nature and extent of regulation through catastrophe reinsurance across different countries.
Government-sponsored reinsurance is a kind of public-private partnership that marries the merits of both government and reinsurance. 90 The origins of such partnerships can be traced to the nuclear liability conventions which emerged in the 1960s. 91 Government-sponsored reinsurance programs have since expanded to many lines of insurance, including medical malpractice, 92 expropriation insurance, 93 crop insurance programs, 94 and terrorism insurance after the September 11 terrorism attack. 95 Since the government has substantial credit capacity due to its ability to raise money through tax or borrow money by issuing debt far more readily than private insurers or reinsurers, 96 it is widely recognized that the government can help address catastrophic risks in some respects, and can thus be used to support the failures of the primary insurance market.
97
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Vol. 23 310 coverage for natural catastrophe risks, and the government intervened through ad hoc assistance in the aftermath of disasters until 1982. 99 The 1982 disaster law required private insurers to underwrite catastrophic risks and permitted them to cede those risks to CCR, the state-guaranteed reinsurer. 100 To gain the benefit of the government guarantee, CCR pays an annual "premium" to the government (Article R. 431-16-2 Insurance Code), similar to private retrocession. 101 CCR provides a coverage system which compounds twofold layers based on two separate treaties: a 50 percent quota share treaty and a stop-loss treaty with an unlimited governmental guarantee. 102 Those risks not covered by the quota share treaty are subject to the stop-loss treaty. The stop-loss treaty with an unlimited governmental guarantee enables primary insurers to underwrite high severity hazards.
Loss-Sensitive Premiums. Loss-sensitive premiums require that reinsurance premiums should reflect an actuarially fair cost and reinsured losses. CCR offered coverage on identical terms and a rather low price to all ceding companies in the first fifteen years as a result of benefits from an unlimited guarantee from the French Treasury. 103 In 1997, CCR revised its reinsurance terms because of the deterioration of the claims figures and changes in the primary insurance market. It began to move forward to loss-sensitive premiums setting, and its rating of the "stop-loss" covers was decided based upon each individual insurer's loss record.
104
Such loss-sensitive premiums setting represents a good start, but it still has a long way to go. With the governmental guarantee, CCR charges relatively lower premiums to primary insurers than other private reinsurance companies and thus crowds them out of the market. 105 On the 314 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL Vol. 23 314 approval.
119 Under this approach, JERS is able to access the underwriting materials of its ceding companies. Besides this arrangement, the duty of utmost good faith is also enforced by reinsurance treaty provisions. The Earthquake Reinsurance Treaty between JERS and private insurance companies includes the retrocession provision, which provides that primary insurers cede their underwritten risks to JERS, and JERS in turn retrocedes the risks in the second layer to the primary insurers and the Japanese government with equal portion.
120 Retroceding 50 percent of the risk in the second layer to primary insurers contributes to their performance of the duty of utmost good faith.
Providing Risk Management Service. One purpose of establishing JERS is to facilitate loss mitigation and a recovery process through the insurance industry. However, in practice, the NLIRO, rather than JERS, undertakes major service works for primary insurers.
Indirect Regulation of Insureds. Since JERS is licensed to conduct business in Japan, there is no need for a fronting agreement. JERS has incentives to regulate insureds' behavior and awareness of earthquake risks because primary insurers cede 100 percent of the risks to JERS. For example, JERS uses deductibles to enhance individuals' risk mitigation efforts.
121
C.
THE TURKISH TCIP Compared to CCR and JERS, the Turkish government does not establish a specific reinsurance company to assume catastrophe risk. The Turkish government provides contingent liquidity support when the payments of claims exceed TCIP's capacity. 122 It could be regarded as reinsurance since it is the last resort. The first layer reinsurance arrangement under the mechanisms of TCIP is the international reinsurers, which assume the transferred risks from TCIP. Therefore, the regulatory techniques of reinsurance include both international reinsurers and the Turkish government. 
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In 1999, Governmental Decree Law No. 587 on Compulsory Earthquake Insurance ("Decree Law") came into force and gave birth to TCIP in the aftermath of the devastating Marmara earthquake.
123 TCIP is a public-private partnership ( Figure 5 ). Insurance companies act as agents to TCIP and cede 100 percent of all risks acquired by TCIP, and they receive a commission from the pool.
124 TCIP transfers risks to international reinsurers through sharing pools under the management of international reinsurance companies, like Munich Re. 125 The claims payment of TCIP is dependent on international reinsurance and on the amount of funds collected (partially from the government). 126 The board of directors represents the government, experts, and insurance companies. The administrative body of TCIP is the General Directorate of Insurance within the Prime Ministry Under-Secretariat of the Treasury, but the business operation is managed by Milli Reasürans ("operational manager"), a national reinsurance company. 126 It would only be triggered by an event equivalent to an earthquake in Istanbul with a 200-year return period (technically, an earthquake with an exceedance probability of 0.5 percent). See GURENKO, supra note 122, at xi.
127 Başbuğ-Erkan & Yilmaz, supra note 124. All of its business functions-from sales to reinsurance to claim management-are subcontracted to the private insurance industry, and the TCIP has no public employees. See GURENKO, supra note 122. Loss-Sensitive Premiums. Since the business operation of TCIP follows a market-oriented approach, and its underwritten risks are transferred to international reinsurers, it is reasonable for international reinsurers to charge loss-sensitive premiums to control the moral hazard of TCIP. Loss-sensitive premiums require that reinsurance premiums should reflect an actuarially fair cost, and they constrain TCIP to underwrite appropriately. With the burden from the reinsurance, TCIP adopts a differential risk-based pricing approach and imposes construction maintenance obligations on the insured in the policies to mitigate underwritten losses.
129
The Duty of Utmost Good Faith. Primary insurers play a different role in TCIP compared to their role in the French CCR or the Japanese JERS. Primary insurers act as agents to TCIP, and the pool assumes all the earthquake risks. 130 The duty of utmost good faith is not suitable for primary insurers. In contrast, TCIP transfers risk to international reinsurers. 128 Başbuğ-Erkan & Yilmaz, supra note 124. 129 Article 14 of Governmental Decree Law No. 587 on Compulsory Earthquake Insurance ("The owner who causes or allows the building and each independent section thereof to be altered contrary to the related design and in a way that will affect the load-bearing system, loses his entitlement to compensation in as much as the actual loss arises or increases because of such reason."). 130 von Lucius, supra note 124.
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From the perspective of international reinsurers, it requires TCIP to perform the duty of utmost good faith. The organizational structure of TCIP, to some extent, might guarantee its performance through public-private partnership.
Providing Risk Management Service. Reinsurers play an important role as consultants, especially in the conception of TCIP. As a matter of fact, TCIP was formed with the cooperation of the World Bank, the Turkish Government, Milli Re, reinsurance brokers, and Munich Re.
131
International reinsurers play an important role in providing risk management services and contribute to the operation of TCIP and catastrophe risk management in Turkey.
Indirect Regulation of Insureds. Since international reinsurers, such as Munich Re, are licensed to conduct business in Turkey, there is no need for a fronting agreement arrangement. There is no empirical evidence that TCIP indirectly regulates insureds.
D. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Controlling moral hazard and providing incentives to loss control benefit both reinsurers and primary insurers. Such efforts will encourage ceding companies to regulate behaviors of policyholders, decrease cost for ceding companies, and enhance profits for reinsurers. It is a win-win strategy for both reinsurers and primary insurers. Compared to private reinsurers, government-sponsored reinsurance meets more challenges to fulfill regulatory techniques due to political pressures and other constraints. Table 1 summarizes the regulation by government-sponsored reinsurance among the three countries in the preceding discussion.
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Not clear Yes
Indirect regulation of insureds
No
Yes No
This table shows that no government-sponsored reinsurance fully performs regulatory techniques. It seems that the Turkish TCIP is subject to less moral hazard than the French CCR and the Japanese JERS. TCIP cedes risks to international reinsurers following a loss-sensitive premiums approach and thus has more incentives to underwrite appropriately, such as identifying "bad risks," enforcing building codes, and educating the public to raise their awareness to catastrophe risk. Meanwhile, international reinsurers not only helped found TCIP, but also worked as consultants to supply risk management services. The application of regulatory techniques of reinsurance helps TCIP work sustainably. For example, TCIP supplies a model solution, especially for developing and middle-income countries where rigorous catastrophe risks exist.
Different from TCIP, the French CCR and the Japanese JERS are both government-sponsored reinsurance institutions and not involved with other private reinsurance companies. Although they do not adopt loss-based premiums due to political pressures, they are better in enforcing primary insurers' duty of utmost good faith than TCIP. CCR's system is particularly suitable to France for several reasons. The first reason is cultural influence. In France, people value the national solidarity principle and are tolerant of cross-subsidies between different classes of risk and different regions, both of which guarantee a single-rate price for reinsurance. The second reason is social adequacy and affluence. As a developed and high-income country, the French government has more capacity to sponsor policyholders. The third reason is the moderate exposure to disasters. None of the twenty-five worst natural disasters recorded, including earthquakes, typhoons, and tsunamis, occurred in France. 132 In addition, during the last several decades , none of the natural disasters which caused the top ten insured catastrophe losses occurred in France. 133 Japan faces more severe catastrophe risks than France because of the frequent occurrence of earthquakes and tsunamis. The establishment of the Japanese JERS is the compromise between the government and the insurance industry: the government provides reinsurance capacity as a last resort and facilitates insurance affordability. 134 There is no doubt that JERS refuses loss-sensitive premiums but follows a general fair-value principle for price setting. Under such a situation, JERS pays more attention to monitoring primary insurers' performance of duty of utmost good faith and indirect regulation of insureds to control moral hazard and mitigate losses.
VI. EXPANDING REGULATION BY GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED CATASTROPHE REINSURANCE TO CHINA
This Article has reviewed the imperfections of private reinsurance, mainly due to the apparent shortage of reinsurance capital, especially during hard markets. Also discussed were government-sponsored reinsurance programs in France, Japan, and Turkey, which represent both high-income and middle-income countries. The focus now is to explore the possibility of expanding regulation by reinsurance to China.
A. THE ISSUE OF THE GOVERNMENT'S PROVIDING REINSURANCE CAPACITY IN CHINA
Section IV has explained the imperfections of the private reinsurance market for catastrophe risks, but these market failures are not sufficient to justify any and all government intervention: there are many different forms of government-provided reinsurance, some of which may be ineffective (no efficiency gains achieved) or even detrimental (causing efficiency losses). 135 One popular approach to government intervention is to provide a government bailout to victims, including ad hoc direct payment and establishing compensation funds. This type of ex-post bailout is known as the Whole-Nation System and generally seen as problematic.
136
Another popular approach to government intervention is government-provided insurance. Compared with ex-post government bailouts, this type of government intervention looks more attractive, since an ex-ante insurance approach could accumulate reserves and may provide incentives to mitigate losses before disasters if associated with risk-based premiums. However, this type of government intervention is also generally seen as problematic. 137 Even for China, where private catastrophe insurance has not yet developed, the government should facilitate private insurance rather than provide government insurance. The Chinese government could adopt a reinsurance regime for catastrophes or provide reinsurance capacity as a last resort. Such arrangements and intervention provide considerable incentive for primary insurers to control moral hazard and mitigate losses associated with catastrophic disasters.
Right now, China has begun to stimulate the development of catastrophe insurance to complement government action in addressing catastrophe risks. The government's provision of reinsurance capacity would also be a response to the concern and demand of private insurers and reinsurers.
The current insurance industry has few incentives to underwrite catastrophe risks partly due to scarce insurance and reinsurance capacity. 136 Simply speaking, the problems include undercutting potential victims' incentives for risk prevention and loss mitigation; posing a heavy fiscal burden for the government and may cause negative distributional effects; leading to political inefficiencies and etc. 137 For example, government-provided insurance always delivers a subsidy that private insurance does not give and inflicts two distortions: (1) regressive redistribution favoring affluent policyholders; and (2) inefficient investment in residential property by locating too many assets in vulnerable areas. Some scholars have reviewed and examined two government-provided insurance programs: (1) the National Flood Insurance Program; and (2) Florida's state owned Citizens Insurance, and found that both perceptions of government-provided insurance performance along two normative metrics: fairness and efficiency, are wrong. See Committee of the Communist Party of China on Some Major Issues concerning Comprehensively Deepening the Reform," which expressly stated that "we will establish an insurance system for catastrophe risks." In 2014, catastrophe insurance program trials were launched in Shenzhen, in the Pearl River Delta (a densely populated metropolitan area and also one of the world's most disaster-prone regions), and in the Chuxiong region in the southwestern province of Yunnan, known to be prone to earthquakes. 138 However, private catastrophe insurance is one of the least developed lines in China. For example, after the 2008 Great Sichuan Earthquake, only 0.3 percent of the total losses were covered by insurance companies. 139 Private insurers do not have the capital to fully cover catastrophe losses. The total capital of China's property insurance companies is much lower than the total amount of losses caused by natural disasters. Table 2 shows the existence of this big gap. Moreover, the China Insurance Regulatory Commission has implemented China's Risk-Orientated Solvency System as of 2015. 140 The new solvency regime requires insurers, like the Solvency II Directive in the European Union, to hold sufficient capital in their reserves, especially the capital for catastrophe risks that they are facing. 141 In order to underwrite catastrophe risks, insurers have an increasing demand for more financial capacity and share a significant portion of the insured losses with reinsurers. Reinsurance is an important potential complement to expanding primary insurers' capacity to underwrite risks. However, reinsurance currently does not provide strong support for catastrophe insurance in China. At present, the China Reinsurance (Group) Corporation (its predecessor, the People's Insurance Company of China Reinsurance, was created in 1996) is the only domestic reinsurer in China, with consolidated total assets of around $30 billion and net assets of $8.6 billion.
142 Its capital is much lower than the annual losses caused by natural disasters. Although China's reinsurance market has become open to foreign reinsurance companies after China's entry into the World Trade Organization, only a few reinsurance companies, such as Swiss Re and Munich Re, have established business operations in China, and they are only in the initial stages of reinsuring risks. By 2013, there were only eight foreign reinsurers who had registered branches in China. 143 When underwriting catastrophe risks, domestic reinsurers will strongly demand government sponsorship, which could provide the government with deep credit capacity.
